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1.  Introduction  
 
Long term care concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is delivered 
informally by families– mainly spouses, daughters and step daughters – and to a lesser extent 
formally by professional care assistants. Formal care is given at home or in an institution (such as 
care centers and nursing homes). The governments of most EU Member States are involved in 
some way in the provision or financing of long term care services. However, the extent and 
nature of their involvement differs widely across countries.  
In the future, the demand for formal care services is likely to grow substantially. Long term care 
needs start to rise exponentially from around the age of 80. .The number of persons who are 80 
years or older is growing faster than any other segment of the population in all EU Member 
States. It is expected to triple by 2060, according to recent population projections. We anticipate 
pressure on resources demanded to provide long term care services. This pressure will be on the 
three institutions currently financing and providing LTC services: the state, the market and the 
family.  
 
These three institutions have their pluses and minuses. The family provides services that are 
warm,  cheap  and  distortionless,  but  these  services  are  restricted  to  each  individual’s  family 
circle. For a variety of reasons, some dependent persons cannot count on family solidarity. The 
state is the only institution that is universal and redistributive but quite often its information is 
limited  and  its  means  of  financing  are  distortionary.  Finally,  the  market  can  be  expensive 
particularly where it is thin and without public intervention, it only provides services to those 
who can afford it.   3 
In this paper we first discuss the nature of dependency in old age and the reasons why it is not 
easy to insure it. Then, we will give some of the more recent forecasts regarding future needs of 
LTC. We discuss what explains the underdevelopment of private and social insurance for LTC 
and what should be done to allow them to meet future needs. A further section is devoted to the 
role of family. 
 
 
2.  The risk of dependency and its insurability 
 
Loss  of  autonomy  or  dependency  reflects  an  inability  to  perform  some  of  the  most  basic 
everyday activities due to old age (e.g. getting up, dressing, washing, eating, walking and so on) 
and the need for assistance in order to carry out such activities. The loss of autonomy should be 
clearly distinguished from illness, disability and handicap, although these four concepts are not 
totally independent of each other. Well accepted grids are used to provide a way of measuring 
loss of autonomy that aims to be objective. In other words there is a consensus on the nature of 
the LTC needs that should be covered by insurers, public or private.  
 
The demand for private insurance will depend on the existence of public schemes and vice versa. 
For an insurer, either private or public, LTC carries three major hazards
 3.  
 
The first one is the risk of escalating costs. According to some experts, an extension of life span 
goes hand in hand with an extension of the amount of life spent in a situation of total or partial 
loss of autonomy. LTC is an emerging risk whose total cost will increase more rapidly than 
national wealth. This naturally raises the problem of pricing in so far as the underlying trend is 
still not properly understood. 
 
 The second threat for the insurer is the phenomenon of adverse selection, which may imply that  
only people with a high probability of losing their autonomy subscribe to LTC policies. It has 
been observed that people buying LTC insurance contracts have a higher likelihood of becoming 
disabled  than  those  who  do  not  buy  such  contracts.  Similarly,  people  who discontinue  their 
contracts have a much lower probability of becoming disabled than those who do not.  
                                                 
3 This is partially based on Kessler (2009)   4 
The third difficulty for the insurer is that of moral hazard. Within the context of LTC, moral 
hazard is not due to the behavior of the policyholder but to that of his social environment. The 
perception of LTC risk is a very recent phenomenon. It does not come from the increasing wealth 
of society as much as from the rural exodus and the desire for autonomy of both parents and 
children. Consequently, elderly parents are less and less likely to live under the same roof as 
their children. This development is certainly nearing its end, but it highlights the point that the 
notion  of  dependence  is  determined  by  more  by  the  social  perception  than  by  medical 
considerations. This perception is not going to stabilize over the next years. Criteria for loss of 
autonomy are relatively vague and susceptible to widely varying interpretations, depending on 
the social climate – in the future we may consider that having trouble taking a bath constitutes a 
loss of autonomy in bathing, etc.  
 
To sum up, there is today a wide agreement on how to assess the severity of dependence on the 
basic of standardized medical tests. Yet, at the same time, there is much less agreement as to the 
nature of care that is called for. To put it otherwise, testing the degree of dependence is deemed 




3.  Forecast of needs 
 
In the projection of EC(2009) dependency rates are drawn from SHARE. The outcome of this 
scenario is frightening: in EU27, the % change in the number of dependent elderly over the 
period 2007 2060 is 115; it is 128 for EU10, the “Old Europe”. Assuming a pure demographic 
scenario, that is, assuming that the probability of receiving formal care at home and formal care 
in an institution remains constant at the 2007 level, the % change in the number of dependent 
receiving care in an institution would be 185 in EU27 (155 for EU10); for those receiving formal 
care at home the % change would be 151 (171 for EU10). Finally, the % change for those relying 
only on informal care would be 84 in EU27 (119 in EU10). 
 
Finally, according to the EC 2009 Ageing Report (EC 2009), public  expenditure on  LTC is 
projected to increase by 115% on average for the EU27. The anticipated increase ranges from 
65% in France and the UK to 175% and above in the Czech Republic, Spain, Malta, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia.    5 
4.  The role of family solidarity 
 
Most seniors with impairments reside in their home or that of their relatives, and they rely largely 
on volunteer care from family. These include seniors with severe impairments (unable to perform 
at least four activities of daily living). And many people who pay for care in their home also rely 
on  some  donated  services.  The  economic  value  of  volunteer  care  is  significant,  although 
estimates of it are highly uncertain. Whether this solidarity is sustainable at its current level is an 
important question. Sources of concerns are numerous. The drastic change in family values, the 
increasing  number  of  childless  households,  the  mobility  of  children,  the  increasing  labor 
participation of women are as many factors explaining why the number of dependent elderly who 
cannot count on family solidarity is increasing. An important feature that is often neglected is the 
real motivation for family solidarity. For long, we have adopted the fairy tale view of children or 
spouses helping their dependent parents with joy and dedication, what we call pure altruism. We 
now increasingly realize that family solidarity is often based on forced altruism (social norm) or 
on strategic considerations (reciprocal altruism). In this section, we review some recent work on 
these issues. 
 
Knowing the foundation of altruism is very important to understand how family assistance will 
react to the emergence of private or public LTC insurance. For example, the introduction of 
social LTC insurance is expected to crowd out family solidarity based on pure altruism but not 
necessarily  that  based  on  forced  altruism.  In  families  where  solidarity  is  based  on  strategic 
exchanges (bequest or inter vivos gifts in exchange for assistance) the incidence of social LTC 
scheme will be a decline in intergenerational transfers. The issue of crowding out is pervasive as 
it concerns not only the possible substitutability between family solidarity and formal schemes, 
but also between social and private LTC.  
 
As an illustration of the huge literature
4 devoted to these issues, we mention a few contributions. 
The  classic  paper  on  strategic  bequests  by  Bernheim  et  al.  (1985)  views  bequests  as  a 
compensation for filial attention. This hypothesis is tested for the US. In this type of model 
parents have a hold on the game. At the other extreme there is the paper by Konrad et al. (2002) 
who show that some children choose their location in such a way that they will be unable to 
directly assist their parents in case of dependence. There is a location game with one child ending 
                                                 
4 For a survey of this literature, see Cremer and Pestieau (2009). up living close to his parents, the others locating far away. Whereas this model seems to fit 
German data, it does not apply in Japan according to Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2007). This 
literature indicates well that family solidarity is important but that it is not necessarily based on 
pure altruism but on strategic considerations or social norms. 
 
 
5.  The LTC insurance market puzzle 
 
One can be surprised by the very low demand for LTC insurance, which cannot be explained by 
traditional  lifecycle  theories.  The  market  is  relatively  thin  in  most  countries.  There  are  two 
exceptions: the US with 6 millions insurees and an experience of 25 years and France with 3 
millions insurees. We list a number of factors, empirical and theoretical, that can explain the 
puzzle. 
5 
• Underestimation of dependence risk 
Most people underestimate the private cost of dependency and overestimate the amount of 
benefits (Cutler,1993). There is also a tendency to underestimate the probability of getting 
dependent.  
• Crowding out of social assistance 
There is the widespread argument according to which social assistance (in the US, Medicaid) 
would  crowd  out  private  insurance.  According  to  Brown  and  Finkelstein  (2004)  the 
American  Medicaid  ,  as  a  last  resort  payer  would  explain  a  2/3  contraction  of  the  US 
insurance market even if it were actuarially fair. 
• Adverse selection 
Elderly people seem to have better information than the State or the market as to the 
occurrence of dependency .It has been observed that people buying LTC insurance contracts 
have a higher probability of becoming disabled than those who do not buy such contracts 
(Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003) and people who discontinue their contracts have a much 
lower probability of becoming disabled than those who do not (Finkelstein et al. 2005).  
• Moral hazard 
Ex ante moral hazard does not appear to be relevant. However, ex post moral hazard seems to 
be frequent in that the assessment of needs (rather than the determination of the severity of 
dependence) is open to controversy. This has lead the French insurers to offer a lump sum 
                                                 
5 For an overview, see Cremer and Pestieau (2009). reimbursement as opposed to the American policy of reimbursing actual expenses.  
• Altruism 
A  LTC insurance  reduces the cost of institutionalization and thus will not be bought by 
parents who want to be aided by their children in case of dependency (Pauly, 1990).  
• Cost of LTC insurance 
The cost of LTC is often considered as prohibitive for most. The yearly price of a nursing 
home in the US ranges between $40 000 and $70 000 (Taleyson, 2003).  
 
 
6.  Do we need a fifth pillar? 
 
There are very few countries with explicit LTC social insurance program. Among these there 
are France, Germany and Belgium (Flemish region). Furthermore, these three programs are 
not very generous: they only cover a small fraction of LTC cost (typically 500€ in Flanders), 
and yet their sustainability is uncertain. The most developed of these schemes, the German 
one, was introduced in 1995 and has been coined as the “5th pillar” to the social security 
system
6. This LTC insurance covers the risk of becoming dependent on nursing care and it is 
taken out with the relevant (public or private) health insurance provider.  
To be fair, in most countries, health care systems cover the medical aspects of dependence. In 
addition, the assistance side of social protection provides means tested LTC nursing services. 
The best known example of that is the American Medicaid, which is suspected to discourage the 
development of an efficient market for LTC insurance.  
 
As  we  have  seen  above  there  is  some  work  on  this  issue,  mostly  empirical.  There  is  little 
theoretical  work  on  the  issue  of  LTC  social  insurance.  To  approach  this  issue,  one  has  to 
consider a social planner with some objective function comprising equity and efficiency aspects. 
This planner takes as given the supply and demand responses of individuals and the behavior of 
families and private insurers into account. If by any chance market forces and family solidarity 
yield a desirable outcome our central planner does not intervene. A few questions have already 
been addressed in this area 
 
                                                 
6 The first four are : health, family, unemployment and retirement. 7.  Conclusions 
 
Europe’s  era  of  long term  care  (LTC)  has  arrived.  Long term  care  concerns  people  who 
depend on help to carry out daily activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, going to bed, 
getting up or using the toilet. It is mainly delivered informally by families– usually spouses, 
daughters  and  step daughters  –  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  formally  by  professional  care 
assistants. Formal care is given at home or in an institution (such as care centers and nursing 
homes). Where is the problem? Right now the provision of LTC is not adequate, and the 
future appears to be gloomy. The source of the problem is twofold, demographic and societal. 
On the one hand, one witnesses a rapid increase of people aged 80. The issue of dependency 
arises precisely in that age bracket. On the other hand, with the drastic change in family 
values,  the  increasing  number  of  childless  households,  the  mobility  of  children  and  the 
increasing rate of activity of women, particularly those aged 50 65, the number of dependent 
elderly who cannot count on the assistance of anyone is likely to increase. Those two parallel 
evolutions explain why there is a mounting demand on the government and on the market to 
provide alternatives to the family. However, the reasons that explain why the role of the State 
and the market has been so small up to now are unlikely to disappear spontaneously. 
 
In this paper we have discussed the nature of these causes and the extent to which we can 
expect them to fade away. The solution of LTC has to be found in an integrated view of the 
role of the market, the State and the family. One needs public authorities who are willing to 
do more than just providing cheap talk about LTC and who are ready to adopt policies that 
welcome and even foster the intervention of both the market and the family. Solutions exist, 
but they will not bring us to the first best optimum. There are problems that cannot be solved 
even with the best will. The fact that individuals act opportunistically and that they will then 
hide both characteristics and actions that can be used by private insurers and the government 
cannot be avoided. This being said, the tracks of reform are known. First of all,much can be 
done to thicken the LTC insurance market. The government can surely help, but the industry 
itself has its own responsibility and should exhibit more imagination in the future. Regarding 
family solidarity, there are measures (part time work, tax deductions) that can be taken to 
facilitate combining work and assistance. It is important to remember that family solidarity is 
crucial, but should rest as little as possible to forced altruism. Finally, the government can 
intervene not only indirectly by fostering private insurance and family assistance, but directly 
by providing all sorts of services. First and foremost, a real political will is needed. Even though we are all threatened by dependency, LTC remains an unattractive political issue. We 
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